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In the past decade there has been a notable increase in research studies
by economists in the area of population-economic relationships. On
the one hand, Malthusian demographics,! which emphasized biological
drives in explaining family size, has given way to attempts to make
population an endogenous rather than an exogenous variable in studies
of economic growth and household behavior. For example, the "new
home economics," pioneered by Gary Becker's seminal paper delivered
at the 1960 NBER Conference on Demographic and Economic Change
in Developed Countries, has convinced many social scientists that the
decision to bear children may be productively analyzed in the context of
rational decision-makers applying the calculus of cost-benefit analysis.2
On the other hand, economists are beginning to question the theoretical
and empirical foundations of some long-held economic-demographic
connections highlighted in studies of economic development and to
make needed refinements based on alternative analytical frameworks.3
One of these connections relates to the effect of higher dependency rates
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on economic development, and in particular the effect of larger family
sizes on the household's rate and composition of saving and labor force
participation.4
In most models where these economic-demographic connections have
been explicitly investigated, children are assumed (1) to make rather
mechanically determined consumption demands (through adult-equiva-
lency weights) on the household's resources; (2) to have an adverse (or
possibly neutral) effect on the household's work force participation;
and (3) to be "financed" by drawing down on the household's level of
saving.5 These models and assumptions are increasingly being ques-
tioned. The effect of children on the household's rate of asset accumu-
lation is an empirical issue. For example, children may increase or
decrease the market or home work activity of parents, and children may
contribute directly to this activity. Likewise, children may make large
consumption demands or relatively small ones, given the scale economies
present in certain types of household consumption. Children may stim-
ulate or deter the rate of asset accumulation, depending on the nature
of the household's saving motivations and on whether the saving mea-
sure is broadened to include human-capital investmer,ts as well as finan-
cialsaving. In summary, the influence of alternative family sizes and
structures on basic household economic decisions-saving, consumption,
income generation-is a very complex matter. The influences are likely
to vary in direction and magnitude over time and across countries. We
must be reluctant to accept simple generalizations of the adverse influ-
ence of large families until household behavior has been subjected to
much closer analytical and empirical scrutiny. Lamentably, a careful
assessment of the current state of the art in understanding the effect of
population growth on the economy conforms to Simon Kuznets's analy-
sis of this issue expressed at the 1960 NBER conference: "We have no
tested, or even approximate, empirical coefficients with which to weight
the various positive and negative aspects of population growth. While
we may be able to distinguish the advantages and disadvantages, we
rarely know the character of the function that relates them to different
magnitudes of population growth."6
In this paper we develop several empirical models of the household
that highlight the effect of alternative family sizes and structures on
saving and income and that in tum examine the effect of selected eco-
nomic influences on the family-size decision. Microeconomic and micro-
demographic data on urban Kenya are utilized to evaluate these models.
We find that many of the traditionally held adverse effects of family size
and structure on household saving and income simply do not hold in
Kenya.7 Moreover, some effects of children that are seldom considered
in economic-demographic household modeling tum out to be relatively
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We cannot generalize from our results. While the basic models em-
ployed in this paper may be broadly applicable, their particular parame-
ters may change from setting to setting and over time. Until these types
of empirical paradigms are forthcoming in sufficient volume for several
countries, using microeconomic and microdemographic data from low-
income as well as high-income countries, there will be little solid basis
for identifying the effects of alternative household sizes and structures
on household behavior, and population's effect on economic develop-
ment.
7.2 Models of Household Behavior
The primary dimensions of household behavior to be modeled are
saving, income, and family size, all hypothesized to represent interre-
lated decisions. In exploring the various empirical and demographic
specifications of such a model, the sets of equations describing house-
hold behavior will be modified in two general directions. First, the
concept of household saving and investment will be expanded from the
traditional financial concept to include the household's expenditures on
children's education. This framework requires the construction of a
different measure of saving that includes human-capital investments.
Second, the occurrence of child deaths can itself be treated as endoge-
nous, not so much in a decision-making, behavioral perspective, but
rather because certain household attributes (e.g., children ever born and
income) that may influence child mortality are in part within the control
of the household's decisions.
Section 7.2.1 presents the "basic disaggregated model" where child
deaths are taken to be exogenous, where saving is defined to exclude
human capital investments, and where the effect of children by sex on
saving is explicitly examined. This basic model is then extended to in-
clude investl1lent in children's education (section 7.2.2) and endogenous
child deaths (section 7.2.3). For ease of exposition the models are pre-
sented in explicit form, and the variables are specified to conform to
Kenyan data-file restrictions.
7.2.1 The Basic Disaggregated Model
The basic structural model is presented in equations 1-4. Expecta-
tions on the direction of the partial effect of the various independent
variables are indicated by superscript signs; a question mark appears
where the causal influences flow in both directions and the net influence
is therefore uncertain.
(1) S = ao + a1Y+ + a2 C-fA + a3 C-mA+ a4C-1I
+ aliA+m + aaA2-m + a7(1/U)?406 Allen C. Kelley
(2) Y = bo+ bIelh + bZC?mh + baC?a + b4A +m
+ b5Az-m+ b6E+mp + b7E+m8 + bsE+lp
+ b9E+18+ bIOT\+bllrl
(3) C eb = Co + cIY+ + cz(1 - e -c3Af)
+ C4E - mp + C5E- ms + C6E - Ip + C7E- Is + csC+a
(4) C eb = Cmh + Clh Ca+ Ca,
where S = household savings in Kenyan shillings
Y = household income from all sources in Kenyan shillings
Ceb = number of children ever born
Ca = number of children living away from the household
Ci/' = number of children living at home (i= m = male; i =
f = female)
Ai= age of adult (i= m = male household head; i= f =
wife)
EiP = primary level is the highest educational attainment of
the household member (=1; 0 otherwise); i = m =
male; i=f= female
Ei8 = secondary level is the highest educational attainment of
the household member (=1; 0 otherwise); i = m =
male; i= f = female
U = number of years the household head has lived in the
urban area
Tk = household head is a member of the Kikuyu tribe (=I;
ootherwise)
T l = household head is a member of the Luo tribe (=1; 0
otherwise).
This model has three endogenous variables of primary interest: saving
(5), income (Y), and children ever born (Ceb); and three endogenous
variables of secondary interest: the number of children living away
from home (Ca), the number of male children living at home (Cmll),
and the number of female children living at home (CII.}.s
Since the primary emphasis of this model is to isolate some of the
interactions of key economic and demographic variables, the demo-
graphic specifications are extensive, including (1) the number of chil-
dren in the household (CI" + C,Il"), (2) the sex composition of the
children (CI", Cmh), and (3) the household's structure in terms of the
number of children living at home and the number living away from
home (elh + Cmh, CIl). A justification of these choices of demographic
influences is considered below in the equation-by-equation discussion of
the model. It is sufficient to note here only th".t the traditional roles of
male and female children are quite different in the Kenyan household.
Moreover, the household's asset accumulation and labor force participa-407 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
tion decisions (captured in Y) are plausibly influenced by the number
of children outside the household who may potentially remit income to
the primary household unit or who may be attending boarding school.
The Basic Disaggregated Model's Key Decisions: Saving, Income, and
Children Ever Born
Saving. As in most models of saving, the primary economic influence is
captured by the positive effect of income,n and the primary demographic
influence is represented by a life-cycle plan measured by the household
head's age. lO There are reasons to expect a somewhat smaller life-cycle
influence in developing than in the developed countries, as well as the
possibility of a somewhat different life-cycle plan. These reasons relate
to the importance of the extended family where children serve as a
source of income security (particularly in old age) and to the frequently
held proposition that individuals' planning horizons are relatively short
in low-income countries.l1 The first observation suggests not that the
life-cycle saving plan is unimportant, but rather that the pattern of life-
cycle saving may be different in developing countries. That is, the house-
hold may substitute investments in children (both quantity and quality)
and in the extended family for financial saving. If this were the case, the
life-cycle financial plan would call for a decline in saving as the house-
hold head approaches retirement. This represents the age when the re-
turns on previous child and extended family investments would begin
to be realized.
The hypothesized influence of children on household saving is nega-
tive, although there are possible differential effects depending on the
child's sex and whether the child lives at home. The overall negative
influences are several: children may represent a form of future security
and thus substitute for current financial saving; children will increase
consumption expenditures, although scale economies in consumption
will attenuate this effect; and large families provide greater security
against uncertainty in earning power.12 Whether boys have a greater or
smaller negative effect on saving than girls is largely an empirical issue,
depending on differential consumption requirements and on differential
family investment levels in children. The latter influence will be sensitive
to the relative rate of return of investing (e.g., educational expenditures)
in boys versus girls. In some low-income settings, boys represent a more
attractive investment than girls since boys are charged with providing
financial security for their parents in old age. In Kenya, however, girls
provide the household with a bride-price varying, in part, with the qual-
ity (e.g., educational status) of the girl. This bride-price phenomenon is
plausibly explained by the high value of women in rural production,
where they are not only responsible for child care and household up-
keep, but are also farm laborers. Finally, children away from home will408 Allen C. Kelley
lower current household saving to the extent that these children, as well
as those at home, represent potential or actual remitters of income, that
is, to the extent that these children are an income-yielding asset.13 The
negative effect of Ca on saving may be larger than that of Cmn or Crn
since children away from home are likely to supplement current income,
while children at home are not yet in a position to do so. Children away
from home may also induce a reduction in financial saving if these
children are at school, and if as a result the household is shifting its
resources from financial toward human-capital investments.
A final determinant of saving that is included in the model is urbani-
zation, measured by the length of time the household has lived in the
urban area. This variable might be taken as a proxy for the degree of
household ties to the extended rural family, an influence that can be
expected to exert a negative influence on household saving.14 The urban
area also provides wider outlets for saving, as well as some "forced"
saving (e.g., employer retirement plans). For both of these reasons,
urbanization should exert a positive influence on saving. Attenuating this
influence might be the desire and ability of the household to increase its
consumption owing to the desire to maintain a socially determined eco-
nomic standing (i.e., the influence of the relative-income hypothesis),15
as well as the wider opportunities for consumption afforded by the urban
area. These various influences that flow in opposite directions result in
an ambiguous prediction on the effect of urbanization on household
saving. Irrespective of the direction of influence, however, the marginal
effect of urbanization is likely to decline with the length of time the
household is in the urban area. A nonlinear relationship, captured by
the inverse of urbanization, is therefore postulated.
Income. The family decision that explains the household's income is the
level and the nature of the labor force participation of the various fam-
ily members. Ideally, a detailed household model would examine the
determinants of this labor force participation as well as the determinants
of nonlabor income. In the interests of simplicity of model construction,
we have elected to explore a subset of this set of decisions and to focus
on the determinants of total household income.
The two major determinants of household income incorporated in
most models of this type are age and education. Age reflects the possi-
bility of a life-cycle earnings pattern whereby earnings reach a peak and
may decline at later stages of employment, depending in part on the type
of employment. If skills and education are important attributes of the
job, earnings may actually increase throughout the life cycle; that is,
human-capital skills may appreciate in value and improve with use. The
opposite argument might apply to manual employment, where the capi-
tal stock (in this case the physical capital stock of the worker) depre-409 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
dates with use. Earnings, in part reflecting labor productivity, would
decline as a result. Since this latter type of employment is most prevalent
in Kenya, we hypothesize that oY/oAm > 0 and OY/OA2m < O.
Education will exert a positive effect on income. This effect can be
expected to be relatively large in the low-income setting where educa-
tional skills are relatively scarce.I6 In Kenya the value of education to
economic advancement is widely known. The government has been com-
mitted to greatly expanding the educational opportunities of its popula-
tion. There has been an emphasis on primary and intermediate school-
ing, and the supply of workers with secondary and college-level skills is
still relatively small. As a result, the differential effect on income of
secondary over primary education can be expected to be large. The
model incorporates both the male household head's and the wife's edu-
cation levels to reveal any differential effects of education that may
occur in Kenya.I7
Children may exert either a negative or a positive effect on income
and work force participation. On the one hand, the presence of children
in the household deters the labor force participation of the mother, al-
though this effect may be small in the low-income setting where substi-
tutes for the services of the mother in the home are more readily avail-
able.Is On the other hand, children may add directly to the family's
income;I9 they may also induce adult family earners to work harder and
longer to support the added consumption.20
Sex-specific child effects on family income will vary from country to
country, depending on the relative value of boys versus girls in terms
of the household's commitment to investment in child-related human
capital and depending on the possible existence of sex bias in employ-
ment. For example, if male children represent the primary form of
security for the household in old age, there may be a greater allocation
of educational expenditures to boys than to girls. Work force participa-
tion to provide the income for this investment may well be stimulated
by the presence of male children. Moreover, mothers may directly as-
sume some of the responsibility for educating and training their daugh-
ters. As a result, the mother's work force participation may be particu-
larly deterred by the presence of daughters. Alternatively, daughters
may themselves assist in housework and child care, permitting mothers
to participate in the market work force. Finally, boys may find it easier
to obtain market employment and to contribute to household earnings.
Whether there are in fact differences in family income owing to the sex
composition of the children cannot be assessed on a priori grounds and
is therefore an empirical issue.
The effect on family income of children away from home is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, their separation from the household will result
in a smaller contribution to the household's earnings derived from the410 Allen C. Kelley
child's direct labor. On the other hand, they may represent an income-
earning asset that reduces the need for the household to earn, given the
commitment of children to care for their parents in old age.
The Kikuyu and Luo tribes, both politically powerful and economi-
cally active, may possess different income-earning levels and opportuni-
ties than other Kenyans. This possibility may be associated with the
particularly strong value they place on investment in education; it may
be associated with differential access to capital markets or possibly
greater awareness of opportunities for investment in income-generating
activities; and so forth. They may also have greater preferences for work
over leisure.21 Hard evidence that systematically documents any differ-
ence in economic behavior among tribes is almost nonexistent, although
speculation is abundant. Given this lack of evidence, and given the in-
adequate analytical underpinnings predicting the nature of any tribal
differences, we remain agnostic in our speculations and are content to
explore the presence of a tribal influence empirically, but without any
a priori expectation of the direction of the influence.
Children Ever Born. Families are assumed to strive for a number of
surviving children, which is the net income of the number of children
ever born (Ceb) and the number of child deaths (Cd)' In the present
version of the household model, the number of child deaths is taken to
be exogenous; a later version will explore an endogenous specification
of this variable. Because families attempt to meet their target number of
surviving children, child deaths, other things being equal, will exert a
positive influence on the number of children ever born.22 Indeed, given
a positive probability of child deaths, there may be overreplacement of
children who have died; that is, the estimated parameter of Cd may
exceed unity. On the other hand, if the household is unwilling or unable
to replace a deceased child with another live birth, then the estimated
parameter Cs in the Ceb equation will be less than unity.23
The relationship between female age and number of children ever
born is well established in the demographic literature. This is largely
based on the relationship of age and biological fecundity. Fecundity is
greatest in the early years of marriage, diminishes in middle age, and
reaches zero when sterility occurs.24 This relationship is captured in our
model by a hypothesized nonlinear relationship in parameters.
The effect of income on the number of children ever born is somewhat
complex.25 This relationship has been most extensively exposed in writ-
ings on the "new home economics" by economists who effectively em-
ploy standard techniques of price theory to the family-size decision.26
Children are assumed to be consumer durables, providing child services
that are a normal good (i.e., the income elasticity of demand is posi-
tive) and that require direct costs (e.g., food and clothing) and indirect411 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
costs (e.g., the parents' time) to acquire and enjoy. Through the stan-
dard income effect, an increase in income will increase the household's
demand for child services. On the other hand, this increased income may
be associated with (and caused by) a higher value of the parents' time.
This higher value of time, in turn, will exert a negative price-substitu-
tion effect; that is, children will be more expensive to raise and enjoy
in terms of the opportunity cost of the parents' time. It is often assumed
that the negative substitution effect outweighs the positive income ef-
fect.27 The relation of income and children ever born is, of course, an
empirical issue. Indeed, in the developing economy where there are
relatively more low-cost alternatives to the parents' time in child-rearing,
the positive income effect could well dominate.
The positive income effect on the demand for child services has come
under attack from authors who have questioned the ability to separate
the income effects from the price effects. It has been alleged that society
establishes "norms" or social pressures that result in higher costs for
children of parents in higher status groups. As a result, larger incomes
do not necessarily raise the utility of children. Operationally, greater
utility can be derived only from child expenditure levels that are larger
than those of the parents' "peer" group. Thus, the price of a given level
of utility from children would increase with the family's normal income,
since this income simultaneously implies a corresponding higher-status
peer-group level. These arguments, if empirically important, would at-
tenuate the positive income effect.28
If one extends the conception of the value of child services from that
of a consumer durable to that of a producer durable, where children are
expected to contribute directly to income as well as to remit earnings to
their parents in old age, then the income effect may be even more power-
ful. Some authors have hypothesized that in a developing economy,
given the high value of children for direct production, income security,
and current utility, there may be an excess demand for children; supply
factors may in fact constrain family size.29 These supply factors relate
in part to the health of parents, which affects fertility and child mortal-
ity. Higher incomes and education will result in lower child deaths and
will provide the ability to acquire better health and nutrition, conducive
to larger family sizes. For these supply-oriented reasons, increased in-
come in low-income societies may also result in larger family sizes over
those income ranges up to a threshold subsistence consumption level.
The effect of education on the number of children ever born is, like
the effect of income, quite complex. More highly educated parents com-
mand higher income. This particular association between education and
income may be quantitatively important in developing countries, where
skilled and educated manpower is relatively scarce. However, in our
model, this education-income effect is captured in equation 2, and thus412 Allen C. Kelley
the influence of education in the children-ever-born equation represents
influences other than the income effect of education.30 More highly edu-
cated parents also command higher wages, and thus the opportunity
cost of producing and consuming child services increases with education
levels. Because wages increase more than proportionately to increases
in education in Kenya, we would expect the negative price-substitution
effect of education on children ever born to be higher for E;8 than for
Eip- Moreover, since the burden of child care rests largely on the mother,
we would expect Emp > E,p and Em8 > E'8.
Several other linkages have been highlighted in the literature. First,
Robert T. Michael (1973, p. 173) has shown using American data that
"more educated couples use contraceptive techniques more extensively,
approve of their use more thoroughly, and adopt contraception at an
earlier birth interval. Consequently, more educated couples are ... less
likely to have 'excess fertility' or 'unwanted' births." He also demon-
strates that more highly educated parents employ relatively more efficient
and effective contraceptive techniques, other things equal.31 Second, in
less developed countries where supply factors may constrain family size,
more education may serve to release these supply constraints. According
to Encarnacion (1973), below some threshold level more education
results in better knowledge of health practices, enabling women to have
more children and enabling families to avert some child deaths.
Finally, a few economists and many sociologists have associated
higher levels of education with systematic changes in preferences away
from child services and toward competing goods and services, and away
from numbers of children and toward fewer but higher-quality children.
It is held that more highly educated parents have a greater preference
for better educated children, other things equal. Moreover, better edu-
cated parents may also have longer time horizons, influencing their
preferences toward consumer durables, on the one hand, and toward
more durable (e.g., higher-quality) child services on the other. Unfortu-
nately, neither economists nor other behavioral scientists have developed
an acceptable theory of taste formation. Thus, while education may
indeed affect tastes in some unspecified manner, to date it has not
proved feasible to identify this influence empirically.32
In summary, with the possible exception of the influence of education
at very low income levels on the knowledge of health practices, the
effect of education on the number of children ever born is expected to
be negative.
Children at Home and away trom Home: Closing the Basic
Disaggregated Model
There are a priori reasons to expect that household saving behavior
will be different depending on whether children are older and outside413 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
the household or whether the family is supporting and investing in chil-
dren within the home. In the present version of the basic model, the
location of children is taken to be endogenous. This specification can be
justified in econometric terms, since one would expect that the error
term in the children-ever-born equation would itself be related to and
explained by family size, the sum of children living at home and away
from home. A somewhat improved model specification is therefore ex-
pected by the endogenous treatment of Ca, C"'h' and Cf/" It should be
noted, however, that we are not particularly interested in explaining
these child-location and child-sex relationships from a behavioral or an
analytical perspective. The method of estimating Ca, C""" and Cfh is dis-
cussed below in section 7.4.2.
7.2.2 The Basic Disaggregated Model Modified: The Decision on
Investment in Child Education
The basic model considers only household capital accumulation in
the traditional forms of financial saving: housing, pension-fund contribu-
tions, savings accounts, bonds, stocks, and so forth. This may represent
an overly restrictive and unrealistic model of the typical household in a
less developed country, where the investment in human capital, and
notably in the education of children, may represent a major saving moti-
vation and a direct outlet for household investment funds. This follows
for several reasons. First, as already discussed, children may represent
a producer as well as a consumer durable. They may provide for parents
in their old age; they may also contribute to the household's current
income. The level of this earned and/or remitted income from children
is related to the value the market places on the labor services of the
child; this in turn is positively associated with the child's education.33
Second, the value of education itself is relatively large in low-income
countries, where educational skills are scarce. Third, children may rep-
resent a safer and less expensive outlet for investment funds than many
forms of financial assets, where underdeveloped capital markets may
result in expensive information and search costs, infeasibly large or
"lumpy" investments, and higher investment risks given the uncertainties
of investing in new enterprises in the early stages of economic devel-
opment.
Finally, in Kenya a large share of the costs of education has in the
past been privately assumed. Unlike higher-income countries where this
form of "saving" is in large part involuntary through compulsory educa-
tion, and where schools are financed largely through taxation, in Kenya
education has been voluntary and school fees have constituted a notable
source of educational finances. School fees on the order of 10% of
household income have not been uncommon. Given the financial burden
of school fees, members of the extended family have traditionally as-(5)
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sumed some role in amassing the savings necessary to underwrite the
education of promising children.34 In 1974 the government of Kenya
removed fees for the first four years of schooling (standards 1-4); the
fees for the upper elementary levels were also lowered and standardized.
However, the data analyzed in the current study apply to the period of
higher school fees. Moreover, there are still substantial private educa-
tional costs, particularly at the secondary and university levels.
Turning to the determinants of investment in children, we will con-
sider four variables: income, number of children, education of the father
and mother, and tribe. These variables, together with our expectations
on the signs of the estimated parameters, are summarized in equation 5.
Ie = fo + fl y+ + f2C+mil + f3C+{II+ f4 E '!mp
+ f5E1"", + fnE1{p + f7E1{8 + fRT\ + fnr,.
Both as a normal consumption good and as a form of saving, educa-
tional expenditures will be positively associated with income. Similarly,
investment in educat~on will be directly related to the number of chil-
dren, although this re~ationship may be somewhat complex. Other demo-
graphic factors such ?s child parity, intelligence, and sex may also have
an effect on the household's educational investments. Indeed, a case can
be made whereby the level of educational expenditures on children is
relatively insensitive to the number of children in the household.3;' If, for
example, educational investments in children are viewed largely as an
augmentation of a producer durable, this investment will compete with
other forms of financial investment by the household. The level of in-
come may be the single most important factor determining the level of
total saving. Other factors may then enter to largely explain the compo-
sition of that saving, as well as the composition of consumption.:lG If this
is the case, the number of children may represent a relatively unimpor-
tant determinant of total educational expenditures.37 Other factors could
well dominate: the availability of "promising" (e.g., relatively bright)
children, the number of boys (if they in fact possess a higher rate of
return on educational expenditures), child parity (if custom and tradition
allot the duty of supporting the parents according to parity), and so
forth. In our model, while we hypothesize a positive effect of number
of children on educational expenditures, this may not be a particularly
strong relationship. Moreover, it is possible that educational expenditure
on boys will exceed that on girls.3R
The effect of the household head's education on investment in educa-
tion is also complex. On the one hand, there may be a positive relation-
ship to the extent that the household head's preferences for education
as a consumption good are directly associated with his own education.
On the other hand, there may be a negative relationship to the extent
that the household head's own education may have been in part financed(6)
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by the extended famiIY.,As a result, the commitment to repay this family
debt through remittances is likely to be directly related to the level of
his own education.an The effect of the mother's education on child-in-
vestment expenditures is also complicated. Like her husband, she may
have a preference for investing in her children's education that is posi-
tively associated with her own educational level. On the other hand,
since she is responsible not only for child-rearing, but also for the edu-
cation of the children, her own education may substitute for or be a
complement of child-investment expenditures. The relative strengths of
these various influences is not known with sufficient precision to permit
a prediction of the direction of the effect of the mother's education on
child-education expenditures.
It is widely asserted in studies of Kenya that there are differences by
tribe in preference for education.40 There is almost no concrete evidence
that isolates these differences. We include tribe as a possible variable
explaining educational expenditures but remain agnostic on the direction
or magnitude of the effect.
7.2.3 The Basic Disaggregated Model Modified: Child Deaths
Endogenous
Models that seek to explain the household's family-size decision typi-
cally formulate this goal in terms of the number of surviving children.
A child death, other things equal, will exert a positive influence on the
number of children ever born. There have been several successful em-
pirical models that have estimated this effect of child mortalityY Sel-
dom, however, have researchers also attempted to identify the factors
that explain child mortality and to include child mortality as an endoge-
nous variable in the children-ever-born equation.42 Such an endogenous
specification of child mortality is formulated in this section as a modifi-
cation of our basic model of household behavior.
While a child death is not a behavioral phenomenon in the sense that
the family "plans" to implement a number of child deaths, it is plausible
that child deaths are influenced by several household-specific variables,
some of which are to a certain extent within the household's control.
These variables, together with expectations on the signs of the estimated
parameters, are indicated in equation 6.
Cd = 80 + 81Y- + 82C+ eb + 83A-I+ 84A2+1
+85£-Ip +86£-18'
We expect child deaths to decline both with the household's income
and with the level of mother's education. Higher income provides more
resources for better diet and health care for mothers and children. Addi-
tionally, higher levels of education provide knowledge of the dietary and
health factors conducive to child survival.43416 Allen C. Kelley
When deaths are included as an endogenous variable in the equation
for children ever born, the influence of education on children ever born
should decrease (given the removal of the negative effect of education
on deaths); similarly, the influence of income on children ever born
should increase (given the removal of the negative effect of income on
deaths).
The effect of age on child deaths is straightforward. Since we are
considering only child deaths related to children who are brought to
term and excluding miscarriages, we expect the incidence of child deaths
to decline with the age of the mother. This is due to the greater ability
of older mothers to care for children. On the other hand, there are
biological reasons to expect that child mortality will increase with age.
In particular, the incidence of congenital malformation and genetic dis-
ease increases with age and parity; this increase is particularly rapid
after approximately age thirty-five.44 The net result is expected to be an
increasing prevalence of child mortality by the age of the mother, espe-
cially toward the end of the childbearing cycle.
Finally, since the exposure to the risk of child deaths increases with
the number of children in the family, we expect a positive sign on the
estimated parameter of the variable children ever born.
7.3 Data, Variable Definitions, and Values
7.3.1 The Data
The data used in the empirical analysis below pertain to three urban
areas of Kenya: Nairobi, Kisumu, and Mombasa. These data were col-
lected from December 1968 to October 1969 by the Central Bureau of
Statistics, an organization that has been responsible for many household
surveys and that has a permanent staff of trained and experienced enu-
merators, statistical analysts, and data processors.
The sample frame was confined almost exclusively to African house-
holds. Through disproportionate stratified sampling, more households
were selected from the upper- and middle-income strata than from the
lower-income stratum. The final sample included 1,146 households.
Most of these represented "complex" households, where there were more
than two adults or where there were children who belonged to different
adults outside the household. Unfortunately, both parents of the children
were not identified in the survey. Since the present research focuses on
the determinants of family size, as well as the effect of family size on
other household decisions, it was therefore necessary to include in the
sample only households with two married adults, where there were no
"other" household members besides the children of the household head.
This reduced the sample to 401 households.417 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
This sample of households may exhibit somewhat weaker ties to the
extended family than the complex households. However, an analysis of
the expenditures of the subsample indicates that this group does indeed
remit some income outside the household, presumably to the extended
family. Thus the households in our subsample should not be interpreted
as being nuclear in the behavioral sense of having no economic ties to
the extended family.45
7.3.2 Variable Definitions and Values
Table 7.1 presents the means and standard deviations of the continu-
ous variables used in the empirical analysis, and the relative frequency
distribution of the classificatory variables.
Income (Y) refers to total household income earned (not received)
during the period and includes the basic salary, bonuses, overtime, hous-
ing allowances, net business profits, receipts from the sale of own pro-
duce, and income from rents, pensions, and transfers.46 This definition
and measurement includes elements of both transitory and permanent
income. Distinguishing between these two types of income would enrich
the analysis both analytically and empirically, but for two reasons the
costs of separating income components appears to exceed the benefits,
given the present research objectives. First, those techniques that have
been employed using cross-sectional data to measure permanent income
have reduced estimation efficiency and are deficient analytically and
statistically in other dimensions.47 Second, the combination of the two
income components employed in the present research identifies typical
household income variation, assuming that the share of the household's
transitory and permanent income does not change over time and that
these classes of income are not differently distributed among households
over time.
Financial Saving (S) is measured as the difference between earned
income and actual household consumption.48 This saving definition has
two primary difficulties: the treatment of cash remittances outside the
household and the treatment of consumer durables. Both are household
expenditures; however, both also incorporate an element of saving. Re-
mittances are used by the extended household for various purposes,
including the financing of current consumption, investment in housing,
and payment of school fees. That share of remittances that results in
some form of saving or capital formation should presumably be clas-
sified as saving to the remitting household. However, no concrete
information is available on the use of remittances by the extended
household.49 Based on data on average saving pertaining to the rural
households (where the urban household income is largely remitted),
20% of the remittances are assumed to represent saving.Table 7.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Employed in the
Regression Models
Percentage
Variable Standard in Indicated
Variable Name Symbol Mean Deviation Categories
Income (Kenyan shillings) y 719.5 794.4
Financial saving
(excluding education) S 7.1 544.8
Total saving
(including education) s* 36.4 550.2
Investment in education Ie 29.3 57.4
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Male children at home Cmh 1.6 1.4
Female children at home Cfh 1.5 1.6
Age ofhousehold head Alii 36.4 9.0
(Age) of household head Am2 1,407.0 736.8
Age ofwife Af 27.9 7.4
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Completed primary Ep 36.4
Some secondary or university ER 26.4
Education of wife
Less than completed primary 57.9
Completed primary Epf 37.4
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Table 7.1 (continued)
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Consumer durables are considered as current consumption. There is
no feasible way to estimate the rate of depreciation of the household's
stock of consumer durables. The treatment of consumer durables as
current consumption, while not entirely satisfactory, is widely employed
in these types of household studies, given the above-mentioned data
constraints.50
Total Saving (S*), which combines financial saving with human cap-
ital investments in education (school fees, school uniforms, books),
broadens the concept of household capital accumulation and is justified
by considering educational expenditures as in part an investment in a
producer durable. While the analytical distinction between education as
current or future consumption and as investment in an income-earning
asset has been clearly delineated by Theodore Schultz and others, em-
pirical estimates of the share of education which is consumption and
that which is investment have been meager. This study will therefore
examine the two extreme cases: one in which education is entirely a
consumption good (whether current or future consumption); and one
in which education is entirely a producer durable. In advanced countries,
the consumer durable motivation plausibly dominates. In lower-income
countries, educational expenditures are also likely to be influenced by
investment motivations. Education, especially more advanced levels such
as high school and college, is a luxury good, given the closeness of many
households to a subsistence level of consumption. Moreover, the rate of
return on education is high, making it an attractive form of investment.51
Measured financial saving in Kenya is small, 7 shillings per household
per period, or about 1% of average household income. As in most
household surveys of this type, saving is likely to be underestimated.
When human capital investments are added, the saving figure rises to 36
shillings, or 5% of average household income. In both measures the
variation is large. This variation is explained in part by real factors and
in part by notable measurement errors common both to the measure-
ment of saving and to any measure formed as a residual of two large
elements.420 Allen C. Kelley
Education (Eip, EiS ) is classified into three categories: less than com-
pleted primary education, completed primary education (EiP)' and some
secondary or university education (EiS)' Kenyan education is divided
into three levels: primary (standards 1-8), secondary (forms I-VI),
and university. There is at present an insufficient supply of secondary
and university facilities, given the fee schedule. As a result, students can
advance to higher education levels solely by passing various standardized
examinations. Only a small fraction of college-age students are admitted
to the university. Because there were only seven households in our
sample that had a member with any university education, considerations
of statistical estimation reliability dictated that we collapse the secondary
and university levels into a single category.52
7.4 Econometric Considerations
The models considered in this study are interactive in nature; that is,
they represent a household paradigm where key decisions are simulta-
neously made.53 Two-stage least-squares regression analysis is therefore
employed throughout.
7.4.1 Nonlinear Estimation
The basic disaggregated model of household behavior summarized in
equations 1-3 is nonlinear in the parameters. This results from the non-
linear association between the variables children ever born and age of
mother. To estimate this model, nonlinear regression procedures were
employed. After some experience with these procedures, it was decided
that the benefits of the precision of nonlinear estimation were far out-
weighed by the costs, especially by comparison with a simpler and
almost as satisfactory estimation method whereby the nonlinear relation-
ship was linearly transformed into two straight-line segments.54
Our a priori expectations with respect to the nonlinear association
between children ever born and age of mother are presented by the solid
line in figure 7.1. Initial estimates that employed nonlinear regression
procedures in fact provided estimates of this relationship that conformed
to these expectations. Namely, completed family size is reached rather
rapidly after childbearing begins and approaches an upper limit in the
middle to later years of life, owing to the onset of female sterility. A
linear approximation to this hypothesis is presented by the two broken
line segments in the figure.
The linear approximation is obtained by defining a dummy variable
D that takes on a value of zero below a specified age A*t and a value
of unity thereafter. The regression equation represented by figure 7.1
would therefore be written as Ceb = a + f3D + yAt+ OAt X D+ E.
The line segment to the left of A*t has an intercept of a and a slope of421 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
Fig. 7.1


















Ceb = h[A f • D· Af • Dj.
D= 1. Af ~ A'f
y, To the right of A*t, the intercept is the sum of a and f3, and the slope
is the sum of y and o. In practice, the estimate of A*t is given either on
a priori grounds or is obtained by experimentation. In the present study,
given our a priori expectations on the nature of the function, the value
of A*t was obtained where the slope of the second line segment was flat,
that is, where the sum of the estimates of y and 0 most clearly approxi-
mated zero.55
7.4.2 Categorical Variables, Cd and Ca, and the Estimation of
Crnil and Cth
Least-squares estimation procedures assume that the error terms of
the estimated regression line are normally distributed,56 This is not the
case where the dependent variable is dichotomous or where it is cate-
gorical with limited variation. Examples of these types of variables in
our model include children away from home (C,,) and child deaths (Cd)'
For C", the percentages of households who had zero, one, two, and three
or more children away from home are 76.1, 7.7, 6,5, and 9.7 respec-
tively; for Cd the corresponding percentages are 76.8, 13,2, 7.2, and 2.8.
Since with ordinary least-squares procedures there are no constraints
on the estimated values of C" and Ca, the resulting estimates can be wide
of the mark,
In the case of Cd, we have elected to explore two separate models:
one in which Cd is endogenous and one in which Cd is exogenous. This
treatment can be justified by our uncertainty about how this variable
should be treated in our model. While child deaths may not be behav-
iorally determined and thus should not be taken as endogenous, they
are indeed influenced by variables such as education and income over422 Allen C. Kelley
which the household has some control. It would therefore be instructive
to ascertain the extent to which the estimates of equation 3, children
ever born, are sensitive to whether Cd is treated as exogenous or endoge-
nous. In the latter case, however, the model must be interpreted with
some care, given the econometric considerations noted above.
Ca, while appropriately treated as endogenous, partakes of the same
types of estimation difficulties as Cd' Moreover, the two endogenous
variables that measure the household's sex composition, C,,,,, and Cjll,
cannot be estimated with a standard regression framework since the
variation in these variables is not systematically explained by household
characteristics. We will therefore estimate C" e,l/'" and Cjh by an alter-
native procedure that is consistent with both the basic model specifi-
cation and the econometric requirements of obtaining asymptotically
unbiased estimates in a household model of the type considered in this
study. In particular, we assume that the ratio of Cn, Cm,,, and Cjh to
surviving children for each household can be treated as exogenous. We
first compute Ce'l> which is estimated for each household from a regres-
sion where C'I) is regressed on the exogenous variables in the system.
This Ce" is then netted of Cf or c" (depending on whether Cd is taken
as endogenous or exogenous) and divided into three parts for each
household, using the ratios noted above. This provides the resulting
values for Cn, Cmh, and Cjh that are used where these variables appear
in the household equations.
7.4.3 Heteroskedasticity
It is plausible that there is less vanatlon in saving for low-income
families than for high-income families, since the ability to save at low
incomes is constrained by subsistence needs. The saving equations were
therefore examined for heteroskedasticity using the Goldfeld-Quandt
test. In all cases heteroskedasticity was found and was corrected by
standard econometric procedures.5T
7.5 The Results
An examination of the results using the basic disaggregated model
reveals that while the model in general conforms to a priori expectations,
there are virtually no effects on household saving and income owing to
the sex composition of the household's childrenf>8 or to the proportion
of the family living within the household. This result implies that we can
notably simplify the modeling of the household's demographic structure
by aggregating these sex- and location-specific influences into either chil-
dren ever born (C,.,,) or surviving children (C8), whichever is appro-
priate to the relationship being examined. This is done in what we423 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
denote as the "compact" model. For expositional convenience, only the
compact model is analyzed in this section. The results of the disaggre-
gated model are presented in appendix tables 7.A.l and 7.A.2.
7.5.1 The Compact Model
The results are presented in table 7.2. The analysis will focus first on
the version of this model where child deaths are treated as exogenous.
Child Deaths Exogenous
As expected, income is the primary determinant of saving. The mar-
ginal propensity to save is 0.110. Life-cycle factors (measured by age)
do not appear to be important in explaining Kenyan household saving.
This is not surprising given the discussion above in section 7.2.1. The
most interesting result pertains to the effect of children on saving. Con-
trary to most theoretical discussions of household behavior, in our model
children do not exert a direct negative effect on financial saving (S).
However, a consideration of the total savings measure (S*) provides
some evidence that children may stimulate asset accumulation when the
savings measure is broadened to include human-capital formation.59
Here the marginal propensity to save is slightly higher, 0.139 compared
with 0.110.
Support for a life-cycle pattern is also absent in the income equation,
where neither of the age terms is significant. Tribal effects, held by many
to be an important determinant of household income, do not emerge as
a significant factor from the data employed in this study. It should be
noted, however, that owing to the selectivity of rural-urban migration,
where the better educated individuals of relatively higher socioeconomic
status tend to migrate, tribal differences may as a result be difficult to
observe in. our particular sample. An interesting finding in the income
equation is the large influence of education. While the effect of educa-
tion on income has been shown to be high in studies of Africa and of
Kenya, confirmation of this result using microeconomic data where some
control has been obtained for related variables has not been fully ex-
plored.60 Our results show that by comparison with the noneducated
household head, primary education contributes 144 shillings per period;
secondary education contributes 910 shillings (see above, table 7.2).
Moreover, female education exerts about the same effect as male educa-
tion. Given the mean household income level of 719 shillings per period
in the sample, the distribution of educational endowments clearly consti-
tutes one of the more important factors explaining the distribution of
income in Kenyan urban society. Finally, it is of considerable impor-
tance to observe that surviving children exert a positive influence on
household income. Whether this influence is direct, through the con-424 Allen C. Kelley
Table 7.2 Regression Results for Compact Model of Household Saving,
Income, Children Ever Born, and Child Deaths Using 2SLS
Constant Y Ceb C. Cd
Financial saving(S)a
Cd exogenous -263.26 .110* 7.46
(-1.09) (2.13) (.33 )
Cd endogenous -241.01 .105* 10.61
(-.99) (2.02) (.48)
Total saving (S*)8
Cd exogenous -286.74 .139" 16.86
(-1.20) (2.72) (.76)
Cd endogenous -260.28 .132* 20.59
(-1.09) (2.59) (.94)
Income (Y)
Cd exogenous -50.69 133.42"
(-.08) (2.88)
Cd endogenous -134.72 123.66*
(-.23) (2.72)
Children ever born (Ceb)
Cd exogenous -2.18* .003* 1.08"
(1.92) (2.35) (5.91 )
Cd endogenous -3.04* .001 2.66*
(-2.86) (.84) (2.30)
Child deaths (Cd) -.16 -.0003* .125*
(-.26) (-2.36) (2.26)
aThe heteroskedasticity correction divided each variable by Y·39.
*Significant at least at the .05 level.
t Jointly significant at least at the .05 level.
§Jointly significant at least at the .05 level.
tribution of child labor in the marketplace and through remittances, or
indirect, by encouraging or permitting parents to work more in market
employment, cannot be adequately isolated in our data set.
The children-ever-born equation provides several interesting results.
Child services are normal goods; that is, they are positively and strongly
related to family income,61 Indeed, family size increases by one child
for every increase in income of 333 shillings. This result is at variance
with some of the "new home economics" studies that show a negative
effect of income on family size. However, unlike some of these studies,
we have been able to control for the interaction of the household size
and income relationships through a model that highlights interactive
decision-making. Finally, children may be more valuable in low-income
societies, where they are not only a consumer durable but a producer
durable as well.
Child deaths and age of the mother enter the Ceb equation in the
expected manner. Families aspire to surviving children; indeed, they425 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior









2.33 -.108 144.84t§ 910.67*t§
(.07) (-.31) (1.54) (7.83)
7.15 -.149 145.44t§ 918.27*t§
(.22) (-.44) (1.56) (7.99)
.167* 6.27* -.173* -.32 -2.82*
(3.09) (1.74) (1.94) (-.67) (-1.83)
.193*t 3.63t -.123t .27 -.27
(4.14) (.96) (-1.38) (.50) (-.14)
.02 -.0003
(.38) (-.52)
appear to approximately replace those children who have died, given
their expectation of a positive infant and child mortality rate.62 (Al-
though the parameter on Cd exceeds unity, tests indicate that it is statis-
tically different from unity only at the 0.25 level.)
We anticipated that the effect of increased education levels would
diminish family size. While the signs on the education variables are
generally negative, the estimated parameters are not statistically different
from zero for primary education levels. Moreover, primary education
exerts a smaller influence on children ever born than secondary educa-
tion, and the negative effect of female secondary education is larger than
that of male secondary education. These are quite plausible results. The
mother assumes the primary role in child-rearing in Kenya. The oppor-
tunity cost of the mother's time in household production rises rapidly
and nonlinearly with education levels. The latter, of course, is partially
a proxy for the price of children. The full effect of changing educational
standards on family size must also take into account the indirect effects426 Allen C. Kelley
Table 7.2 (continued)












Cd exogenous 119.03§ 973.63*§ -105.93 -83.22
(1.34) (5.42) (1.14) (-.99)
Cd endogenous 120.23§ 965.27*§ -106.56 -80.42
(1.37) (5.44) (-1.16) (-.97)
Children ever born (Ceb)
Cd exogenous -.29 -3.88*
(-.70) (-2.72)
Cd endogenous -.03t -l.92t
(-.08) (-1.20)
Child deaths (Cd) -.05 .18
(-.51) (.68)
of education on income, and of income on children ever born. These
relationships are explored in detail in section 7.5.2.
Child Deaths Endogenous
The model that treats child deaths as an endogenous variable provides
several interesting results. While for the statistical reasons discussed in
section 7.4.2 we must be guarded in interpreting the Cd endogenous
model, nevertheless the findings at least suggest some possible influences
taking place within the family decision-making process.
The influence of family size and structure on financial saving (S) and
total saving (S*) is the same in this model as in the one where child
deaths were taken as exogenous. Thus the main finding of the present
study, which relates to the interrelationships of family size and structure
on saving, is preserved.
As in the case of the child-deaths exogenous model, when child
deaths are endogenous surviving children exert a positive influence on
household income. This influence is quantitatively large. Each additional
child results in a direct increase in income of 123 shillings. While our
discussion above clearly allows for this possibility, these results are at
variance with the negative relationship postulated (and sometimes427 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
found) in the "new home economics" studies pertaining to high-income
countries. The factors in the low-income setting that might account for
this difference are (1) the possibility that children may be treated as
producer as well as consumer durables, thereby directly contributing to
income; (2) the lower educational requirements of children, permitting
them to contribute to both market and home production; (3) the facili-
tation of the mother's market employment through providing assistance
in home production (particularly babysitting); and (4) the absence of
strictly enforced child labor laws.
Turning to the child-deaths equation, we find that income exerts a
statistically significant negative effect. Child deaths are also directly re-
lated to exposure to the risk of death, as revealed in the significant
positive parameter on the Ceb variable. Finally, child deaths are not
influenced by the level of education. Presumably, the influence of edu-
cation on mortality is less through "knowledge" of better nutrition and
health and more through its effect on income, the latter providing the
means for acquiring the inputs of better nutrition and health.
An examination of the Ceb equation where child deaths are endoge-
nous provides more insight into this relationship. Specifically, education
no longer enters directly as a statistically significant determinant of
family size; moreover, even the direction of the relationship for Emp has
changed. Apparently the influence of education on family size is partially
indirect, through its effect on the incidence of child deaths. This is an
interesting finding, since education is an omnibus variable in family-
formation studies. This variable has been taken as a proxy for tastes,
the costs of children, and contraceptive efficiency. Our results provide
some clarification of the specific interpretation of the education variable
in the Kenyan case. Increased education is likely to provide more knowl-
edge of, receptivity toward adopting, and ability to adopt better health
practices, dietary standards, and procedures for child care.
An evaluation of the Cd endogenous model must be tempered by the
existence of an implausibly large estimated parameter on the Cd term
in the Ceb equation. Possibly more sophisticated statistical procedures
would improve the results. On the other hand, the results of the Cd
equation itself are plausible, the estimated parameters in the Y, S, and
S* equations are stable with respect to the Cd endogenous specification,
and with only one exception, those parameter changes that have oc-
curred in the Ceb equation broadly conform to a priori expectations. As
a result, while we remain guarded in interpreting the Cd endogenous
model results, we are mildly encouraged by the performance of this
model and are optimistic that future research with endogenous mortality
specifications will make more headway in untangling the nature of the
complex family decision-making process.428 Allen C. Kelley
7.5.2 An Alternative Conceptualization of Household
Decision-making Behavior
Our conceptualization of the household views families as making sev-
eral key decisions simultaneously. For example, the household's decision
regarding family size, as well as its decision regarding the amount of
labor services it supplies to the market (determining a large share of
household income) are made jointly. This is not the only conceptualiza-
tion possible. If instead the family size decision is either an overriding
one in the sense that it is made first and without regard to decisions
relating to labor force participation, or if economic factors do not enter
the decision-making process relating to family size (e.g., if a naive
Malthusian approach to family size determination is postulated), then
a recursive decision-making conceptualization of the household may be
more appropriate. With our simultaneous, decision-making framework,
2SLS provides consistent or unbiased (in the probability limit) estimates
of the various parameters. If OLS procedures are employed, the result-
ing estimates would be inconsistent or biased. However, if a recursive
decision-making framework is hypothesized, then OLS estimates would
not be biased.
It is therefore useful to compare the OLS with the 2SLS estimates to
identify the extent to which the key results are sensitive to the particular
estimation method and to the particular conceptualization of household
decision-making. This exercise has other benefits. When our results are
compared with a limited number of others beginning to emerge in this
literature, a pattern of biases may begin to emerge that will be useful
to appraising a wide range of models of household behavior.63
Table7.3 Regression Results for Compact Model of Household Saving,
Income, Children Ever Born, and Child Deaths Using OLS
Constant y COb C. Cd
Financial saving (S)a -328.29* .221* -6.56
(-1.77) (6.77) (-.98)
Total saving (S*)a -384.95* .257* -3.58
(-2.12) (8.03) (-.55)
Income (Y) -1017.14* 21.14
(-2.30) (1.47)
Children ever born (COb) -3.79* .0002 1.03';'
(5.94) (.97) (7.82)
Child deaths (Cd) .001 -.0001* .127';'
(.001 ) (-2.04) (7.58)
aThe heteroskedasticity correction divided each variable by y.39 (see section 7.4.3).
*Significant at least at the .05 level.429 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
Accordingly, we have estimated both the compact and the disaggre-
gated models using OLS procedures. The compact model OLS results
are presented in table 7.3; the disaggregated model results are presented
in appendix table 7.A.2. Only the compact model results will be ana-
lyzed here, and then only the major differences between these results
and those provided in table 7.2.
The main finding of the study is upheld: children do not exert an
influence on the household's saving level. However, in the OLS version
the parameter on Cs is negative; it is positive in the 2SLS formulation.
The major difference detected in the saving and income equations is the
exceptionally large estimated marginal propensity to save in the OLS
models, ranging from 0.221 to 0.257. This somewhat diminishes the
credibility of the OLS model, although one might justify the larger than
expected coefficient by arguing that the income measure includes notable
transitory as well as permanent components, and thus a high saving
propensity is plausible.
In the income equation there is a notable change in the interpretation
of children's role in the household. In the OLS formulation, the parame-
ter on C.-while positive-is not significant. Thus children do not exert
as strong a positive influence on income as they do in the 2SLS render-
ing of the household.
The major change in the models occurs in the children-ever-born
equation. Income is not significant in the OLS model and, surprisingly,
education exerts a much weaker negative influence on family size. Three
of the four education terms have positive signs, and the negative effect
of female education declines from -3.88 in the child-deaths exogenous





57.82* -.586* 151.73* 998.10*
(2.56) (-2.16) (1.73) (9.65)
.265* 6.81" -.207 .28 .45
(11.40) (2.60) (-3.24) (.93) (1.15)
.004 -.0001
(.12) (-.28)430 Allen C. Kelley
Table 7.3 (continued)
Efp Efa Tk Tz I1U R2
Financial saving (s)a 39.79
(.55) .13
Total saving (S*)a 48.76
(.69) .17
Income (Y) 132.82 877.47* -113.12 -51.03
(1.61 ) (5.37) (-1.31) (-.66) .41
Children ever born (Ceb ) .06 -1.20*
(.22) (-2.03) .45
Child deaths (Cd) -.12 -.04
(-1.42) (-.22) .18
model (2SLS) to -1.20 in the OLS formulation. Sign reversals are not
uncommon between 2SLS and OLS models, especially where there are
notable elements of colinearity between independent variables. Indeed,
there are at least two other studies, which use Puerto Rican and Chilean
data, that find that the positive effect of income on children ever born
diminishes or even turns negative when one moves from 2SLS to OLS
estimates.64 This finding is consistent with our results where the esti-
mated coefficient on income declines from 0.003 to 0.0002. The influ-
ence of education in the OLS model is less plausible than that of the
2SLS framework, given our interpretation of this variable, given the
insignificant income effect in the OLS formation, and given the findings
of others.65
There are at least two possible interpretations that might be offered
in analyzing the differences between the OLS and 2SLS models. First,
since economic factors (the income and price variables) do not enter as
significantly in the OLS formulation, then the Malthusian conceptualiza-
tion where biological factors explain family size, or the Easterlin frame-
work where supply factors dominate at low-income levels, may appro-
priately explain urban Kenyan behavior.66 Second, the OLS results are
implausible and are due to the statistical biases inherent in using OLS
estimators when one examines a simultaneous decision-making model
of household behavior. We lean toward the latter interpretation, given
(1) the large number of studies that have shown the education variable
to exert a negative influence on family size; (2) the consistency of our
results with the pattern of parameter changes beginning to emerge in
the literature where both OLS and 2SLS results are presented; and (3)
the somewhat lower marginal propensities to save found in other studies
of saving. Moreover, if supply factors were constraining, we might ex-
pect to find a positive education effect at primary, but not at secondary,
levels.67 We thus concur with T. Paul Schultz that "simultaneous-equa-
tions techniques are needed if one is to obtain a deeper and more reliable431 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
understanding of the effects of population policies on reproductive be-
havior."68
7.5.3 The Effect of Education on Household Demographic
and Economic Behavior
The primary objective of this study has been to assess the effect of
alternative family sizes and structures on household saving behavior.
While in the previous sections we have shown that the direct effects of
family size on household saving are negligible, there are indirect effects
that must also be taken into account. For example, since family size
(Ceb ) is itself endogenous in the model, the full examination of changes
in saving caused by changes in family size can be analyzed only through
an examination of the effects of changes in one of the model's exogenous
variables. The most interesting variable for this purpose is education.
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the effects on the endogenous variables
owing to changes in the husband's and the wife's levels of education.
There are two ways of presenting these effects. The first is to calculate
the "total" effect. If we designate V j as the endogenous variable of in-
terest, then the total effect represents dVjdEi, which holds constant all
exogenous variables other than E; and allows the remaining endogenous
variables (Vi, i =1= j) to adjust to the change in E;. This formulation
provides no information on the specific way these endogenous responses
are changing but gives only the total net effect of changes in Vj owing
to changes in education. This total effect is calculated by computing the
relevant reduced-form parameters using the estimated parameters of the
structural system. All endogenous-variable interactions are therefore in-
corporated in the estimate of the total effect.69
To gain more information on the indirect effects, we can calculate
(jVj/(jEi' Here all exogenous variables other than Ei are held constant,
as well as all endogenous variables other than the one of specific inter-
est. Since the variable of interest may be influenced by rapid changes
in some of the other endogenous variables, the sum of the indirect effects
will not necessarily equal the total effect. These indirect effects, then, are
obtained from the chain rule where, for example, (jS/(jEi via income
(Y) equals ((jS/(jY) ((jY/(jEf). The first term in the product is ob-
tained from the estimated parameters in the structural equations, and
the second term is obtained from the estimated parameters in the re-
duced-form equations.
Several interesting findings emerge from an examination of the results
presented in tables 7.4 and 7.5. First, and most important, the indirect
effects of children through the income and children-ever-born equations
do not alter our basic conclusion that Kenyan household saving is vir-
tually invariant to the number of children in the family. Thus, for ex-
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increase from prmary to secondary level, total financial saving in the Cd
exogenous model would increase by 88.8 and 66.4 shillings, respectively.
Almost all of this increase is explained by the influence of education
on income (88.8 and 77.6 shillings); the direct effect of education
through children ever born is negligible, as well as the net effects of the
interactions between income and children ever born (not shown). Sim-
ilar results are obtained when we consider the broader definition of
saving and also in both saving equations in the models where child
deaths are endogenous.
Second, education itself exerts a powerful influence on household
saving through its effect on earnings. These results must be qualified,
however. They represent partial equilibrium influences only-that is, the
effect on a single household in isolation. If we were instead considering
a macroeconomic counterfactual experiment whereby education levels
were being notably advanced for the entire urban population, the results
would have to be modified. A notable increase in education standards
for the entire population would likely drive down the rate of return to
education itself and as a result would diminish the income effect revealed
at the partial equilibrium level.
Third, turning to the family-size equations and concentrating on the
Cd exogenous model, we see that the total effects of increases in male
education and of increases in female primary education are moderate.
(The results of the experiment of changing the female's education from
the primary to the secondary level will be discussed below.) These find-
ings are due in part to the opposing income and substitution effects.
The income effect appears to consistently dominate the price-substitution
effect.70 Higher male education levels are therefore likely to increase
family size in urban Kenya. This is also true of an increase in the preva-
lence of primary education among women. Note that while the direct
effect of education in our structural equation estimates is for the most
part negative, representing the price-substitution effect owing largely to
the increased opportunity costs of child-rearing at higher education lev-
els, there are also powerful and more than offsetting indirect effects. In
particular, increased education raises family income. Since the demand
for child services increases with income, education also exerts a strong
and dominant positive influence on family size. This result is in contrast
with the findings of several "new home economics" studies for high-
income countries and indeed with the usual assumption employed in
the analysis of the Chicago model of fertility. However, our findings are
entirely plausible given the institutional setting and the stage of economic
development in the low-income country. In this setting, the return to edu-
cation is unusually high, resulting in exceptionally large income effects.
At the same time, increased costs of child-rearing associated with higher
education (i.e., the higher opportunity costs of the mother's time) are435 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
relatively low given the greater compatability of female work force par-
ticipation and child-rearing. This is particularly true for the types of jobs
available to women who possess only a primary education. Older chil-
dren tend younger children; moreover, the extended family itself pro-
vides child-care services. If policy-makers are concerned, for example,
about the pronatal effect of providing more education, then additional
policies must be simultaneously implemented that effectively raise the
cost of child-rearing. These policies might, for example, raise the oppor-
tunity cost to the female in terms of foregone earnings due to child-
rearing. Compulsory education of children would be one such policy;
implementation of child labor laws would be another. Both policies
would increase the costs of children and, as a by-product, lower the rate
of return to education as the greater supply of educated manpower is
forthcoming.
Fourth, the effect of education on children ever born varies with the
level of female education. An increase in female education from the
primary to the secondary level dramatically reduces family size. This is
in contrast to the increase in family size resulting from an improvement
in female education from illiteracy to the primary level. The explanation
for this relationship has been provided above. Namely, the opportunity
costs in terms of market employment increase rather dramatically with
higher education levels. Jobs that take advantage of higher education
levels are less compatible with child-rearing than jobs that require only
a primary education.71 Government employment is an example of the
former; domestic service is an example of the latter. These findings
suggest that if reducing the birthrate is one of the objectives of policy,
then distributing education toward female secondary education is likely
to have a greater desired influence than a policy that is neutral toward
education levels and toward the sex of the recipient.
Fifth, one of the beneficial effects of increased education is to reduce
child mortality.72 Currently the average number of child deaths per
household is 0.40. An increase in female education from illiteracy to the
primary level would reduce child deaths by 0.09, or 23% of the existing
rate. This is a major reduction. It is interesting to note, however, that a
comparable increase in male education levels has little influence on child
mortality. Thus, in this education range, the greatest benefit of raising
the education level comes through an investment in female, rather than
male, education. Presumably much of the mortality reduction derives
from the effect of education on the wife's knowledge about improved
child-care practices: medical information, nutrition information, and so
forth. We infer this because the negative income effect is relatively small.
A quite different finding is obtained when one examines the effect of
increasing male and female education from the primary to the secondary
level. Here the dominant influence occurs through the income effect.436 Allen C. Kelley
This likely represents a reduction of child mortality deriving from the
ability to obtain better medical care, better food and shelter, and so
forth. Given the greater importance of the male household head's earning
power and the larger effect of education in raising male versus female
earnings, the child-mortality-reducing effects are greater for male than
for female education in the higher education levels. It is interesting that
increasing both male and female education to the completed secondary
level would reduce child mortality to the very low rates found in high-
income countries. However, since such an increase in the education level
is typically found only at rather advanced levels of economic develop-
ment, our results, albeit founded on cross-sectional information, take on
increased plausibility.
7.6 Conclusions
This study has employed microeconomic data from urban Kenya to
examine the interactions of several key household decisions: saving, in-
vestment in education, family size, labor force participation (income),
and child deaths. The underlying hypothesis is that these decisions are
made simultaneously, and that the direct and indirect effects of key eco-
nomic influences and outcomes cannot be revealed on a priori grounds.
Several interesting results have been obtained.
First, the number of children does not influence the rate of household
financial saving. Second, the number of children has an effect on the
composition of saving if this definition is expanded to include human
capital formation and specifically expenditures on education. Third, a
simultaneous-equation model of the household appears to give a more
plausible representation of behavior than a recursive decision-making
framework. Fourth, additional insight into household decision-making
can be obtained in models that consider child deaths an endogenous
variable in the analysis.
Finally, the broad conceptualization of a household in which family
size is determined in the context of a cost-benefit framework appears
promising for urban Kenya. However, contrary to the usual model
where children are considered only as consumer durables, there is some
evidence that children may also serve as producer durables in the low-
income setting. Moreover, in contrast to the usual assumption and
finding of the "new home economics" model, we find that the income
effects of an increase in education may in some instances outweigh the
price-substitution effects, resulting in an increase in family size with
increasing education levels.437 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
Appendix
Table 7.A.l Results of Disaggregated Model of Household Saving, Income,
Children Ever Born, and Child Deaths Using 2SLS
Constant y Cmh C/IL C" Cet
Financial saving (S)·
Cet exogenous -219.88 .083* -4.55 .97 -2.24
(-1.06) (2.10) (-.33) (.07) (-.17)
Cet endogenous -164.35 .073* 7.21 6.41 3.74
(-.73) (1.78) (.47) (.40) (.23)
Total saving (S*)·
Cet exogenous -262.44 .109* -.88 2.46 -1.97
(-1.27) (2.78) (-.06) (.18) (-.15)
Cet endogenous -174.78 .094* 13.57 11.20 7.59
(-.78) (2.31) (.89) (.71 ) (.48)
Income (Y)
Cet exogenous -835.64* 10.22 63.43* 29.45
(-1.81) (.35) (2.18) (.96)
Cet endogenous -607.70 35.66 81.50* 47.04
(-1.17) (1.05) (2.34) (1.31)
Children ever born (Ccb )
Cet exogenous -2.18* .0034* 1.08*
(-1.92) (2.35) (5.91 )
Cet endogenous -3.04* .0014 2.66*
(-2.86) (.84) Cob (2.30)
Child deaths (Cet) -.16 -.0003* .125*
(-.26) (-2.36) (2.26)
"The heteroskedasticity correction divided each variable by y.39 (see section 7.4.3).
"Significant at least at the .05 level.
§Jointly significant at least at the .05 level.
tJointly significant at least at the .05 level.438 Allen C. Kelley
Table 7.A.l (continued)
Am Am2 At Al D
Financial saving (s)a
Cd exogenous 5.36 -.058
(.51 ) (-.47)
Cd endogenous 2.45 -.034
(.21) (-.27)
Total saving(S*)a
Cd exogenous 7.23 -.077
(.69) (-.63)
Cd endogenous 2.54 -.038
(.22) (-.30)
Income (Y)
Cd exogenous 48.71 ':' -.496*
(2.07) (-1.78)
Cd endogenous 36.13 -.384
(1.34) (-1.24)
Children ever born (Ccb )
Cd exogenous .17§':' 6.27§':'
(3.09) (1.74)
Cd endogenous .193§* 3.63§
(4.14) (.96)
Child deaths (Cd) .02 -.0003
(.381 ) (-.52)439 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior









150.41§* 999.14§'~ 125.86§t 884.35§t* -119.36 -59.36
(1.69) (9.55) (1.51) (5.36) (-1.37) (-.76)
143.42§* 973.63§* 120.99§t 907.31§t* -120.80 -67.65
(1.60) (9.04) (1.43) (5.39) (-1.37) (-.85)
-.17§* -.32 -2.81* -.29 -3.88*
(-1.94) (-.67) (-1.83) (-.70) (-2.72)
-.123§ .27 -.27 -.03 -1.92
(-1.43) (.50) (-.14) (-.08) (-1.20)
-.05 .18
(-.51) (.68)440 Allen C. Kelley
Table 7.A.2 Results of Disaggregated Model of Household Saving, Income,
Children Ever Born, and Child Deaths Using OLS
Constant Y Cm /< Chi Ca Cd
Financial saving (s)a -328.14* .22* -5.87 -6.90 -7.01
(-1.76) (6.71 ) (-.53) (-.68) (-.63)
Total saving (S*)a -385.17* .26'" -1.74 -4.79 -4.17
(-2.11) (7.96) (-.16) (-.48) (-.38)
Income (Y) -1002.03* 5.99 37.86* 12.99
(-2.26) (.25) (1.76) (.50)






















aThe heteroskedasticity correction divided each variable by y.an (see section 7.4.3).
*Significant at least at the .05 level.441 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior





148.42* 998.60* 131.56 873.38* -112.95 -50.16 .42
(1.69) (9.61) (1.60) (5.33) (-1.31) (-.65)
.28 .45 .06 -1.20* .45
(.93) (1.15) (.22) (-2.08)
-.17* -.30* .19
(-1.82) (-2.49)442 Allen C. Kelley
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55. It has been pointed out to me by Marc Nerlove that this regression specifi-
cation is not quite correct. To insure that the ends of the lines meet at A", it is
necessary to incorporate the constraint fJ + aA *f = O. The equation then becomes
Ccb= a + "fA f + aD (Af - A *f) + €. We checked our unconstrained regression re-
sults to ascertain the extent to which the constraint was in fact met. Fortunately
it was met almost precisely, and thus the models were not reestimated.447 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
56. I benefited from the advice of my colleague T. Dudley Wallace on the
econometric issues raised in this section.
57. Goldfeld and Quandt (1965). The appropriate transformation of the vari-
ables was obtained by estimating the equation log lEI = 'Y log Y. Each term in the
equation was then divided by Y y/2 to correct for heteroskedasticity. This in theory
reduced the variance of the error term from 0'2YY to 0'2.
58. There is one exception to this statement. Female children at home exert a
significant positive effect on income, likely representing the contribution of young
girls assuming some of the mother's domestic responsibilities and releasing the
mother to engage in market employment.
59. A side equation, not integral to the household model under consideration,
was run to explain the household's investment in education. In both models (child
deaths exogenous and endogenous) the estimate of the Cs parameter was positive,
statistically different from zero at least at the .05 level, and small, ranging from
6.3 to 8.9 shillings.
The child deaths exogenous model is as follows:
Ie = -26.74 + .05Y + 6.29Cs - 2.38Emp - 9.63E",s + 2.01Efp - 60.16Efs
(-3.83) (1.63) (1.70) (-.29) (-.31) (.28) (-1.85)
- .53Tk + 4.98TI•
(-.07) (.79)
The child deaths endogenous model is as follows:
Ie =-28.04 + .028Y + 8.93Cs + 1.60Emp + 12.80E",s + 4.84Efp - 37.62Efs
(-3.97) (.99) (2.66) (.20) (.45) (.68) (-1.26)
- 3.38Tk + 3.09T!.
(-.46) (.49)
This model was reestimated using only households that had children, thereby
permitting a slightly improved interpretation of the parameter on CN• The results
were virtually identical to those obtained above and are therefo.e not presented
here.
60. An examination of the returns to education is provided by Thias and Carnoy
(1972).
61. An extensive survey of the analytical and empirical relationships between
income and fertility has been provided by Simon (1974). See also Chang (1976).
62. The findings on whether the household completely replaces or overreplaces
a child who has died are mixed. See Fredericksen (1966); Heer (1969); Heer and
Smith (1968, 1969); Preston (1975); and T. Paul Schultz (1969).
63. DaVanzo (1970); Harman (1971). Nerlove and Schultz (1970); T. Paul
Schultz (l97Ia).
64. DeVanzo (1970); Nerlove and Schultz (1970).
65. The effect may be negative given the higher costs of child-rearing associated
with higher education levels (the higher opportunity costs of the mother's time,
and the higher costs due to social norms dictating more "expensive" or higher-
quality children), and the greater contraceptive efficiency. Higher education levels
also bring about higher income, the positive influence of which may dominate the
negative "price" effects. Given the insignificance of the estimated parameter on
the income term in our model, we might infer that the income effect is relatively
low, and thus the negative price effects might well dominate.
66. Easterlin (1975).448 Allen C. Kelley
67. Encarnacion (1973).
68. T. Paul Schultz (l971b, p. 1).
69. Let V be a matrix of endogenous variables, X a matrix of exogenous vari-
ables, and E a matrix of error terms. Our model can therefore be written in the
form VI' + X{3 = E, where I' and (3 are the estimated or implied parameters of the
endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. These parameters are obtained
from the structural equations. The corresponding reduced-form parameters can be
found by expressing the endogenous variables as a function of the exogenous vari-
ables. Thus, V = X(_(3l'-l) +Er-1. The relevant parameters, then, are II =
_{3l'-l.
70. Knowles and Anker (1975), who have employed single-equation OLS mod-
els using microeconomic household data to investigate various aspects of Kenyan
household behavior, find that neither income nor the wife's education has a statis-
tically significant effect on fertility. Only urban residence (here defined as whether
the household is urban or rural) has an (negative) effect. Their model is formu-
lated differently from ours, however, since in their framework income is exoge-
nous. It is seen in our study that the endogenicity of income makes a considerable
difference in the results.
7!. This result has been found directly in a study of Brazilian urban households
while the impact of female employment by occupation was examined in detail.
While employment per se did not deter having large families, that specific type of
employment which was incompatible with child-rearing did indeed exert a negative
influence on family size (Kelley and deSilva 1976).
72. For a similar result using a different data file and estimation procedures, see
Knowles and Anker (1975).
Comment Warren C. Robinson
Professor Kelley's paper addresses two questions, which it argues are
closely related: the influence of fertility on household savings and in-
come; and the influence of economic factors on the family-size decision.
The thrust of the answer to the first question is to refute once again the
Coale-Hoover hypothesis that the higher the fertility rate the lower the
savings rate. His interest in the other characteristics of household behav-
ior-family size, labor force participation, and so on-leads him to
adopt a deterministic, human-capital approach to the second question.
It seems to me that within such a model, within such a conceptual un-
derstanding of the household, the original question regarding the savings
rate is irrelevant.
Let me begin by agreeing with Kelley's rejection of the "orthodox"
assumptions of economic-demographic models regarding the savings
rate. There is growing evidence for questioning all three. For example,
not all members of the household share equally in consumption, and this
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is a more subtle differentiation than can be handled by equivalent adult
consumer weightings. Adult males get first priority, children next, adult
females after that in some cultures; in other cultures there is a clear bias
in division of consumables toward male children and against female
children; in many others it has been found that high-parity children
suffer a systematic deprivation as opposed to their older siblings. And
so on. The notion that there is some linear relationship between family
size and consumption needs, or that available consumables are divided
in a more or less equitable way among all household members is almost
certainly not right. The household is a small society with a power struc-
ture, and with rights and obligations distributed in unequal ways and
with a systematic exploitation of some members by others. Children
may be exploited by parents and, almost certainly, females are exploited
by males insofar as they bear most of the costs of childbearing, get few
of the benefits, and have little say in the decision process. One can argue
that these arrangements, including the exploitations, are functional to
the extent that under hard, subsistence agricultural conditions they do
result in perpetuating the household through time as an economic, so-
cial, and demographic entity.
The second assumption of these models is equally dubious. In most
developing countries children become economically active at early ages,
and even before they do they are not a barrier to female work force
participation. In very few parts of the world is child-care viewed as a
full-time job or are children thought of as remaining useless and help-
less until they turn 16 or 18.
Finally, it seems to me that the notion that spending on consumption
for children may be at the expense of savings, and hence asset accumu-
lation misses the whole point. Children are a form of asset accumulation
in many developing societies. If the primary resource of the household
is its own labor services and there is a positive relationship between the
volume of these labor services and the household's income potential,
then, far from competing with the growth of productive capacity and
income potential, a larger family size may contribute to it. The distribu-
tion of such increases in income within the family may be highly exploi-
tative, but that is beside the point. What I am suggesting can be put in
the following way. Under conditions in which the only way to increase
output and income is to increase the labor input, a large family may
actually increase the savings potential of the household, not decrease
it. This all changes quickly once we move into a world with child la-
bor laws, compulsory schooling, in nonagriculture urban settings, with
changed household production function and distributive rules.
But if this view is accepted the search for a link between family size
and savings is pointless, for family size itself is a part of gross investment
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of children is merely an indicator of the asset portfolio held by the
household, and rising financial savings coupled with falling family size
indicates only a changing portfolio. Children cannot be a drain on
savings if they are part of savings. This is what I meant by the irrele-
vance of Kelley's first question once a human-capital model is adopted.
As regards the savings ratio, the basic model takes into account only
financial savings. This is modified to take into account investment in
child quality, namely, educational expenditures. But, if there is anything
to the human-capital approach, then spending on quantity of children as
well as quality should be considered savings also. If couples are con-
sidered to demand children when quality (or price) has started going
up, then surely they must be demanding them when price (or quality)
is lower and quantity is greater. Indeed, the very low financial savings
rate the data present suggests that most of the family savings are taking
the form of investment in children (quality and quantity).
Finally, the nature of the subsample troubles me. The group analyzed
covered 40I urban Kenyan households in which only two married adults
and the children of the head of the household were present. All "com-
plex" households-the other two-thirds of the overall sample-were
excluded. But, if the "complex" household is the norm, does not this
partitioning of the data introduce possible bias in the income or savings
reported? Are not these households more likely to be sending cash re-
mittances to other households, which are notoriously elusive for survey
instruments to catch? Again, financial savings may be understated on
this count.
Turning now to the economic variables effect on fertility, I wonder if
there is any evidence that urban Kenyans actually plan their fertility
as carefully as this model assumes. The mean children ever born is 4.1
in a sample in which 64% of the women are 29 years old or younger.
Also, 40% report 5 or more children, close to the 36% over 29 years
of age. Completed family size for this group almost certainly would be
6 plus, and if this is not natural fertility, it is at least high fertility for
an urban sample. Without some information on knowledge, attitudes,
and practices of contraception, I do not think we can assume that a
deterministic model of fertility applies. Both on conceptual grounds, as
developed by Easterlin, Leibenstein, and others, and also on empirical
grounds as revealed in several recent surveys, including those of Simon,
T. W. Schultz, and Ann Williams, there is abundant room for skepticism
about the usefulness of the same model with the same assumptions in
both developed, literate contracepting populations and less-developed
populations with excess demand for children.
As regards the type of model, it is a simultaneous equations approach
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within the household. Kelley argues that to use a "recursive" model
rather than a simultaneous one is equivalent to saying that one decision
comes first-family size, say-and that the others-labor force activity,
savings versus consumption-follow from this. This he identifies with a
naive Malthusian (biological) no-decision model or, alternately, with
Easterlin's hypothesis about a supply constraint at very low levels of
income making the fertility decision primary. He rejects this approach
and his own OLS results in favor of the more comfortable 2SLS simul-
taneous model.
I have no quarrel with this operational judgment, but I do feel that
there are substantial grounds for rejecting the notion that completed
family size (or children ever born), quality of children, female labor
force participation, and other asset acquisitions are decided in one single
simultaneous decision process when the household is formed. The real
system is recursive and sequential. The decision shortly after marriage
is not Will we have zero to six children? but Will we have a child, and
if so when? That decision is made simultaneously with a host of other
decisions, including wives' immediate labor force plans, the vacation
next year, buying or renting a house, and so on. The outcome of these
decisions is in turn the input for a later round of decisions centering on
a possible second child. And so on. Presumably the system grows smaller
through time as some fairly permanent decisions are made-a home is
purchased, the wife makes a considerable investment in acquiring special
labor market skills, and so forth. Such a sequential model can also be
explicitly stochastic by allowing for such factors as contraceptive failure,
tastes for children (or other goods) that change with socioeconomic
status, and objective changes in external labor market conditions. The
deterministic, simultaneous equations model assumes not only rationality
but unchanging utility functions, perfect foresight, and no genuinely
stochastic elements. These conceptual matters have been treated at
length by Namboodiri, Turchi, Simon, Leibenstein, and others.
I am fully aware that an approach such as I am suggesting would not
be possible using Kelley's data set. He has undoubtedly done the best
he could using a thin data base and a highly simplified model. His dis-
cussion of the variables and his econometric manipulations of the data
are full of insight and skill, and the paper is a contribution to our under-
standing of African demographic-economic interrelationships.452 ADen C. KeDey
Comment Julian L. Simon
General
The context of AIlen KeIley's paper is the nonagreement of population
theory with the empirical data on the relationship between per capita
income and population growth from additional children (Kuznets 1967;
Easterlin 1978; Chesnais and Sauvy 1973). The data show no negative
effect, though existing theory does.
More specificaIly, one of the strands in Malthus's theorizing is that
the resource stock-that is, land-is fixed in the short run. An addi-
tional child therefore causes no immediate increase in total income, and
hence average income immediately falls proportionately when a child is
born. "The constant effort of population ... increases the number of
people before the means of subsistence are increased. The food, there-
fore, which before supported eleven million, must now be divided among
eleven million and a half" (Malthus 1817, p. 11). This proposition,
zero short-run elasticity of family income with respect to children, is the
secondary element in Kelley's study. The main topic of Kelley's paper
is the Coale-Hoover idea of a negative savings effect of additional de-
pendents.
So among the questions Kelley addresses are two of the central con-
cerns of economic population theory: the response of family income
with respect to fertility and the effect of fertility on savings.
KeIley's study is weIl and ingeniously done, up to the limits of the
data. And its presentation is even better-clear, well organized, and
sensible. Confidence in the results is increased by their insensitivity to
making the child mortality rate endogenous or exogenous, and to the
aggregation experiments. The difference between the OLS and 2SLS re-
sults is gratifying rather than worrisome and confirms an important
piece of technical knowledge, that simultaneous-equation estimation is
more appropriate in studying this question.
Kelley's Findings
I am prepared to agree with Kelley that fertility does not depress total
saving. The past evidence on this matter has been mixed, and people's
predisposition to think that fertility depresses savings may have been
part of a general prejudice against poor people's economic rationality
and ability to save. Not only laymen but also economists believe that
the poor are unable to save. For example, in a comment on Leff's work
on dependency and saving, Gupta wrote, "When income levels are as
low as in these two [low-income] groups, there is no margin left for
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savings" (1971, p. 471). Similar views were asserted in the past by such
writers as Arthur Lewis, E. M. Bernstein, J. M. Keynes, and Ragnar
Nurkse (summarized by Panikar 1961). But the data do not confirm
this view.
The biggest body of data on household saving and income is from
India. And many village surveys of Indians, summarized in a fascinating
article by Panikar, then discussed at length by Hoselitz (1964), show
that poor Indian farmers save very respectable proportions of their in-
comes-cash savings of perhaps 12% gross and 8% net. And when
nonmonetary saving is included-as it should be-"the gross saving-
income ratio among rural households would rise to 20% or so." The
savings ratios of poor farmers, then, are not significantly lower than for
the better-off farmers in the world.
Nevertheless, the Kenya data leave me with qualms about Kelley's
finding on savings and fertility. It is hard to know whether the lack of
effect of children on savings indicates real neutrality or errors in mea-
surement. Such measurement error arises, as Kelley notes, both from
the usual problems of measuring savings and from the fact that saving
is here estimated by the arithmetic difference between two large magni-
tudes, income and expenditure, both measured with error.
The dimensions of the observations also give grounds for worry. The
mean income of a family in the subsample Kelley reports on is 719
shillings. Mean financial saving is only 7 shillings, 1% of income. But
Kelley estimates a marginal propensity to save (financially) as 11 %.
This means that if the representative household's income goes up by just
10%-from 719 shillings to 790 shillings-total saving would double
(to 14 shillings). And if the representative household's income falls by
only 10%-from 719 to 647 shillings-saving would fall to zero. Such
a violent response of saving to income, over the very range of experience
that Kelley focuses on, gives one pause. An observed marginal propen-
sity to save ten times as large as the average propensity to save suggests
a major difficulty in permanent-income measurement as well as errors
in measurement of current income.
In brief, Kelley's finding that fertility does not depress saving makes
sense and is consistent with other work. But reservations about the data
sap this finding's strength.
On children and total income, now: Kelley's finding that additional
children increase the work done by parents makes sense. If anything,
Kelley qualifies his finding too much. It is true that he cannot distinguish
between remittances and household earnings. But he can buttress his
findings with the findings of others. Long ago Chayanov (1966), using
Russian peasant data, and a flock of recent writers using data from the
United States and Israel (summarized in Simon 1977, chap. 3), have
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father and a positive effect of older children on the hours worked by
the mother. A positive effect of fertility on average hours of work also
appears in a cross-national study done by Pilarski (1976). And Scully
(1962) showed higher physical and money output per acre of Irish
farmers per unit of land input with more children. So Kelley might be
more assertive in interpreting the increased income that accompanies
more children as showing that children do indeed lead to more work.
My main technical suggestion for the study as a whole is to check
whether the results are sensitive to the sample. It was sound workman-
ship for Kelley to restrict the main subsample to families with two mar-
ried adults, because the status of adults-that is, the identification of
which adults are parents of whom-is not given in the data. But this
subsample made up only 29% of Kelley's original sample.
Kelley should be able to make good guesses about the status of the
third (or even fourth) adult in many families. For example, a woman
more than fifteen years older than the other two married people surely
is a mother of one of them. It would be interesting to rerun the data
with the original subsample augmented in this and other fashions to
see whether the effects of children on income and savings are thereby
altered. If there is no change, we would have still greater confidence in
the results. And if there is a difference, these results might be the more
valid because they cover more people. And Kelley would learn some-
thing about the effects of extended families and of having in-laws in the
home.
A related technical suggestion for his further work is that Kelley split
his observations into those with wife's age 29 or less and those with
wife's age 30 or greater. This would avoid the nonlinear estimation
problem and would enable him to check for interactions between wife's
age and other variables-interactions that are not unlikely. Insensitivity
of results to such a splitting of the observations would strengthen the
results, in my judgment, at almost zero cost.
Now a question: An increment of woman's education causes about
the same increase in income as a similar increment of men's education,
in Kelley's results. This suggests that women work as much as men. Does
this, in turn, suggest that children have no negative effect on labor force
participation? If this result is reliable, it is startling.
Where Do We Go from Here?
If we accept the findings of Kelley and others that explode myths
about family savings and income responses to fertility, where do we
stand with respect to understanding the effect of population growth on
income? By themselves these corrections to the received theory provide
only a very partial reconciliation of theory and empirical reality. Even
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education and physical capital bestowed on each additional child. If we
are to reconcile theory with the aggregate data on the relationship of
population growth to per capita income, we must go beyond the indi-
vidual household and ask about an increase in the number of households,
and investigate the macroresponses to fertility. For some examples:
1. The fertility-induced reduction in investment in educational expen-
ditures per child by the government is far less than the household reduc-
tion suggested by Kelley's data, as shown in cross-national studies by
Simon and Pilarski (forthcoming) and by Anker (1978).
2. We must know more about economies and diseconomies of scale.
It is easy to speculate about the congestion effects in this room of dou-
bling the participants at this conference. But we must also learn more
about how increased population density increases the infrastructure
available to all. For example, increased population density has a very
strong effect on the stock of roads, as is shown in Glover and Simon
(1975).
3. Last, and perhaps most important, we must know more about the
effects of more households and individuals on our stock of knowledge,
as was emphasized by Kuznets at the NBER conference in 1960. And
please note that the knowledge in question is not just the knowledge
created by scientific geniuses. Rather, much of the relevant new knowl-
edge is created by people who are neither well educated nor well paid
-the dispatcher who develops a slightly better way of deploying the
taxis in his ten-taxi fleet, the shipper who discovers that garbage cans
make excellent cheap containers for many items, the supermarket man-
ager who finds a way to display more merchandise in a given space, the
supermarket clerk who finds a quicker way to stamp the prices on cans,
the market researcher in the supermarket chain who experiments and
finds more efficient and cheaper means of advertising the store's prices
and sale items, and so on.
I will end with what I hope is an inspirational message, and what I
am sure is a pat on the back for economics as a science.
The great strength of economics is its insistence on, and its capacity
for, dealing with the indirect and delayed effects of system changes. This
is one of economics' main improvements over untutored common sense.
Our stock in trade is the human and institutional responses to such
changes in circumstances. Population economics is a subject in which
the indirect and delayed effects are particularly crucial, and leaving
them out of the reckoning can lead to absolutely wrong conclusions.
Let's consider some examples, starting with Kelley's work:
1. Saving. A baby immediately needs milk and diapers and a costly
priestly ceremony. All other expenditures are fixed in the very short run,
so these new expenditures must come out of savings. But economics
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expenditures. And indeed this is what Kelley finds, in contrast to casual
observation.
2. Total income. The amount of income-producing labor is fixed in
the very short run, and hence total income does not immediately respond
to an additional child. This is obvious to laymen. But the labor-leisure
tradeoff depends on tastes, and these tastes are a function of per capita
income, as Chayanov showed theoretically and empirically. Kelley once
again confirms this indirect long-run effect, which differs from the short-
run direct effect.
Now let us consider some examples of delayed and indirect effects
that economics has not yet given enough attention to in the context of
population:
3. Natural Resources. Malthus slipped up on the fixity of land, and
Jevons (1865) on the fixity of the coal supply. The difficulty here is
largely definitional. In the short run the relevant quantity is the known
well-defined material stock. But in the longer run, substitution and in-
vention render a physical definition meaningless. Does the concept of
oil include shale oil? Oil from coal? Oil made with solar energy? It is
true in the short run that resources are limited. But in the long run we
create resources and actually reduce scarcity, as is shown by the long-
run downward trends in resource prices (Barnett and Morse 1963). But
this Resources-for-the-Future idea has yet to be integrated into formal
economic thinking about population.
4. Physical capital. In the short run physical capital is fixed in supply.
But in the longer run it is a function of profit. And population size influ-
ences sales and profits. Nor is additional investment always at the ex..
pense of consumption or other investment. So the long-run effect of
population on the stock of physical capital, in contrast to the short-run
effect, might well be positive.
5. Knowledge. Not in the short run, but in the long run additional
children create new knowledge. They do so both because of additional
demand for output and because of the additional supply of minds. We
must stretch our science's capacity to the utmost to determine the nature
and magnitude of this very important but very long-run phenomenon.
We must also come up with more new hypotheses about the long-run
macroeffects of increased population. For example, is there a positive
effect on mental agility and one's stock of information from having con-
tacts with more people?
My pat on the back for economics is that-though perhaps not as
quickly as one might have hoped-it has taken up and emphasized the
indirect and delayed effects of population growth, as is seen in Kelley's
paper. My message is that we must continue to do this with even more
vigor and resourcefulness until we are able to improve our theory of
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growth to the point where we can consider them satisfactorily reconciled.
At that time we may well see that the same increment of population
growth that has a negative effect on income in the short run has a posi-
tive effect in some long-run future. Our judgment about whether popu-
lation growth's overall effect is positive or negative thus depends on the
discount factor with which we choose to weight the long-run relative to
the short-run futures of our society.
Comment Paul Demeny
The subject of Professor Kelley's paper is economic and demographic
household behavior in the urban population of Kenya. Surely, as any
tourist who ever descended on Nairobi could confirm, this is a theme
admirably suited for dissection at a conference on population and eco-
nomic change in developing countries. In Nairobi, the 'visitor sees a city
in the throes of rapid development-a picture of life rich in sharp con-
trasts of poverty and affluence, tradition and modernity, tribalism and
Western mores, disorganization and upward social mobility. He sees the
ubiquitous signs of class conflict; the clash of the young and the old;
and environmental decay next to manifestations of some of the best
urban planning anywhere in the developing world. What is below the
surface is bound to be even more exciting. An anatomy of household
behavior, organized around its crucial demographic components, should
provide important insights into the dynamics of the development process
in contemporary urban Kenya. It would be, of course, unreasonable to
expect Kelley's equations somehow to capture all the essential features
of the ongoing socioeconomic transformation that is behind the picture
even the most unperceptive tourist will not fail to see-unless his gaze
is totally riveted on giraffes. Scientific understanding progresses by disci-
plining one's curiosity and proceeding with rigorous analysis of a man-
ageable segment of life.
Unhappily, the slice of life examined by the paper under discussion
is much too thin to be justified by this principle. In the familiar fashion
of the art, Kelley does deliver numerous propositions on economic-
demographic interactions supported by whole tablefuls of quantitative
findings. But these propositions and findings are singularly uninteresting
and implausible. Let me pick some representative examples. "An in-
crease in female education," we learn, "from illiteracy to the primary
level would reduce child deaths by 0.09." "Each additional child results
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in a direct increase in income of 123 shillings." "If the male household
head's ... education were to increase from primary to secondary level,
total financial savings ... would increase by 88.8 ... shillings." "An
increase in female education of the same sort dramatically reduces fam-
ily size." We are also told why, in simple declarative sentences. "The
opportunity costs, in terms of market employment, increase rather dra-
matically with higher education levels." The findings, of course, make
eminent econometric sense as they follow logically from the data, the
model, and its specifications. But it seems to me that the model is far
too anemic to inspire much confidence in the substance of such state-
ments, let alone to support the policy suggestions the paper sparingly
but bravely spells out. We are dealing with a conflict-free society of un-
changing tastes whose past is neatly captured by the reciprocal of some-
thing called U, the number of years the household head has lived in the
urban area. What about its future? Can the model provide a prediction
on the expected pattern of fertility change in urban Kenya and on the
mechanisms that are likely to govern the process? The model specifies
the variable children ever born in terms of income and educational at-
tainment and, trivially, of age. Interpreting these as proxies for the true
causal variables enables Kelley to make numerical propositions on what
will happen under certain specified conditions; but, plainly, the ability
of the model to grasp the essence of the relevant aspects of the develop-
mental process is severely limited, hence the findings command little
interest. It is hardly surprising that we are warned not to generalize from
the results presented in the paper and are admonished that model pa-
rameters are apt to change from setting to setting and, more ominously,
over time. One can surmise that a series of similar studies for urban
Kenya are in order. But, by the time a pattern of change for the parame-
ter values has emerged-and there is no reason to expect that such a
pattern will lend itself to any useful interpretation-on~ hopes the prob-
lem that sparked the investigation to begin with will have long lost its
significance.
There is, of course, a possibility that that has already happened, at
least if one takes at face value Kelley's argument on the need for his
analysis. That argument focuses on the issue of the influence of demo-
graphic variables on the rate and composition of household savings.
Kelley posits an adverse effect of fertility on savings (in first-approxi-
mation financial savings) as the kingpin of the dominant models of
economic-demographic development, but he claims that these models
are "increasingly being questioned." Such a claim amounts to a vast
understatement. A stress on the significance of household savings, to my
knowledge, disappeared from the literature years ago, and for excellent
reasons. Once Kelley found that the average yearly level of household
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-perhaps simply reporting that result would have made his recapitula-
tion of the verdict just as effective. Kelley's extension of the concept of
saving to include saving for human-capital investment is salutory but far
too narrow. What really matters to society on that score is the quality
of children and, in particular, their economic abilities-entrepreneur-
ship, diligence, honesty, ability to cooperate with their fellowmen, and
so forth. These characteristics of crucial importance for development
are manufactured primarily in the family unit rather than in the schools.
Neither can they be captured by the kind of survey techniques Kelley
has access to.
Let me conclude my remarks by venturing a somewhat fanciful report
on the state of the field to which this conference is addressed. On the
fringes of the social sciences there once lived a primitive tribe called
demographers. They had a happy time in a hunting-gathering existence,
picking up and consuming raw bits and pieces of data that they called
names like "birthrates," "death rates," "rates of dependency," and "gross
reproduction." To diversify their diet, they enjoyed digging up old
chestnuts that their ancestors had buried many years before and chewing
on them. Must infant mortality fall for birth control to be practiced?
Is it true that affluent people have low fertility, and why? Keen to make
sense of their small world, the demographers looked about in wonder
and tried to explain puzzling changes in the objects of their curiosity.
Some came to 'attribute magic properties to some happenings beyond
their ken, developing strange beliefs such as that industrialization makes
the birthrate drop or that education makes gross reproduction wilt.
Others concluded that hospital beds per 1,000 population or telephones
per capita have equally remarkable clout.
These happy and imaginative-if somewhat childlike-people were
one day invaded by a bunch of warlike neighboring tribesmen who got
tired of watching their neighbors' bumbling ways. Equipped with their
superior bronze-age technology, the invaders had little trouble taking
over the demographers' territory; and for a while they had great fun
renaming the trees and the fruits in a logical and elegant fashion and
driving out superstition about causes and effects. Education, they held,
for example, demonstrably does have that wilting effect on birthrates;
but it must be first tidily measured, labeled, and subscripted and seen
as a proxy for other things, such as the value of mother's time. Such
discoveries and the accompanying tidying-up were quite plausibly the
dawn of a new era, with continuing rapid technological progress in store
and full enlightenment within sight. As often happens, however, the
conquerors liked the pickings on the new land, and soon they settled
down, gathering and consuming the same fruits as their former neighbors
who, subjugated and docile, still lived on the same territory. A not un-
pleasant symbiosis had developed. Even though things became a bit460 Allen C. Kelley
crowded sometimes, there were plenty of data to pick from to keep
everyone well fed and satisfied. Also, new data kept growing, the ground
having been fertilized by increasingly benevolent weather, bringing a
steady rain of dollars. The demographers and the now-settled warriors
happily shared a seemingly inexhaustible supply of married women
25-29, or of other more or less interesting age intervals, whose fertility
rates needed to be urgently explained; and there was a rich storehouse
of variables to help the explaining. Lacking in new challenges, sloth
overcame the conquerors. The promise of a golden age faded, and a
bastard bronze age began.
The parable should not be labored further. The main point I am
trying to make is not that the theoretical and methodological advances
made in the eighteen years since the predecessor of this conference met
in Princeton in 1958 are insignificant. Certainly, the superior power of
the models of household demographic decisions borrowed from the the-
ory of consumers' behavior-in contrast, say, to regression analyses of
piles of socioeconomic and demographic data relating to country units
-is beyond dispute. Still, the new micromodels of demographic behav-
ior remain patently inadequate to the task, drained as they are of socio-
logical content and institutional, historical, and psychological substance.
To this basic complaint another should be added, although blandly and
without elaboration. Even within the narrow confines of the model, the
grasp on behavioral variables and processes that can be gotten by using
the kind of data that are now the staple of studies on developing coun-
tries-census data and survey data collected through remote control,
as it were-has now run into rapidly diminishing returns. I know that
many people are highly optimistic about the prospective yield of further
exploitation of the standard survey methodology and the resultant better
microlevel data. Certainly the sponsors of the World Fertility Survey
must be among them. But the available evidence supporting optimism
on that score does not strike me as persuasive.
If the complaints just registered have any merit, some serious soul-
searching is in order for the field. The analytical approach exemplified
by the paper under discussion now seems to claim a disproportionate
share of the attention, the time, and the brains of the best practitioners
of economic demographic studies. The opportunity costs are potentially
important. I suspect, for instance, that I could have been a far more
enthusiastic discussant at this conference if I had a chance to comment
on a work by Professor Kelley that picked up some of the demographi-
cally relevant themes of his recent remarkable book on dualistic eco-
nomic development. Paradoxically, since that economists' invasion the
parochial and narrowly conceptualized traditional concerns of demog-
raphers seem to hold greater sway over the field than ever before. This461 Interactions of Economic and Demographic Household Behavior
conference bears the general title Population and Economic Change in
Developing Countries. Perhaps it has a subtitle I am unaware of, making
it a more specialized affair than this general label indicates. Or perhaps
the National Bureau intends to organize another conference without
waiting until 1994-another eighteen years-to explore important areas
and issues of the economics of population not covered in this conference.
Certainly, even the program of the 1958 NBER conference-although
focused on the less obvious and less pervasive population problems of
the developed countries-had a more catholic formulation than the
present one. Then there were papers on macroeconomic aspects of pop-
ulation growth; on the effect of demographic change on aggregate de-
mand, price level, aggregate employment, and labor supply; on popula-
tion and resources; on the influence of population on the demand for
food; on sectoral effects such as the demand for services. Forays into
general equilibrium analysis were not off limits. In contrast, a detached
observer, listening to our discussions, would have a very lopsided appre-
ciation of economists' potential contribution to a scientific analysis of
demographic aspects of development. Examples of subjects that were
given short shrift form.a long litany: from welfare economics to the
economics of international trade; from externalities theory to the eco-
nomics of public goods; from resource economics to the economics of
development proper. It is unfortunate that little of that potential is cap-
tured by the present program; and it is even more so if the bias correctly
reflects the actual distribution of ongoing academic research in economic
demography. Arguably, what the field needs is another invasion by a
marauding tribe of economists, equipped with new ideas and new ana-
lytical tools.
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